




Islamic ResearchJournal of Emerging Economies & Islamic Research 8(1) 2020, 1 – 11.
www.jeeir.com
©UiTM Press, Universiti Teknologi MARA
Roles and functions of special purpose vehicles (SPV):
A comparison between Islamic and conventional finance
Mohammad Soleimani a*, S. Mustafa Shadab b
a Faculty of Islamic Studies and Economics, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran
b Ph.D. Condidate of Economics. Tehran University. Tehran, Iran
AR T I C L E  I N F O A B S T RA C T
Article history:
Received 16 July 2019
Accepted 11 November 2019
Published 31 January 2020
The SPV (special purpose vehicle) is one of the key components of the
securitization in both Islamic and conventional finance; however the
details of how the transactions are implemented differ subject to the
mode of securitization in Islamic and conventional finance. In
conventional finance, the bank establishes a SPV and transfers its asset
from its balance sheet to the SPV. The assets are used as the collateral
for issuing securitized, debt-like instruments. Nevertheless, in Islamic
finance mode of securitization, the SPV just services the cash flows for
security holders and do participate in debt-issuance. This difference is
originated from the risk-sharing principle in asset-based Islamic finance
which contrasts with risk-transfer nature of an interest-based
conventional finance and results in important differences in ownership
right and valuation of SPVs in the two financial systems.
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The SPV (special purpose vehicle) is one of the key components of the securitization in both Islamic
and conventional finance. Gorton (2007) defines SPV, or a special purpose entity (SPE), as a legal entity
created by a firm (known as the sponsor or originator) by transferring assets to the SPV, to carry out some
specific purpose or circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions. SPVs have no purpose other
than the transaction(s) for which they were created, and they can make no substantive decisions; the rules
governing them are set down in advance and carefully circumscribe their activities. Indeed, no one works
at an SPV and it has no physical location.
The above definition of SPV clearly define its role as a vehicle to implement the transactions in a
securitization process, however the details of how the transactions are implemented differ subject to the
mode of securitization in Islamic and conventional finance. Islamic finance is basically a financial system
structured on risk sharing i.e. the parties share the risk as well as the reward of a contract. It is in contrast
* Corresponding author. E-mail address: solimani@isu.ac.ir
2 Mohammad Soleimani / Journal of Emerging Economies and Islamic Research (2020) Vol. 8, No. 1
©UiTM Press, Universiti Teknologi MARA
to the conventional finance in which the risk is transferred from the financier to the borrower, with the
financier retaining not only the property rights claim to the principal and interest but also that of any
collateral that has guaranteed the financing arrangement. This will happen whenever an interest rate-
based debt contract is used directly or through securitization. (Askari et al., 2012)
The principle of risk sharing has important implications for securitization and hence the special
purpose vehicle. In conventional finance, the bank establishes a SPV and transfers its asset from its
balance sheet to the SPV. In this process - that is known as off-balance sheet financing - the assets are
used as the collateral for issuing new debt-like instruments which is created via securitization such as
Mortgage backed securities (MBS). Nevertheless, in Islamic finance mode of securitization, underlying
assets are owned by the security holders and the SPV just services the cash flows for them. This
securitized assets – which is known as Asset Linked Securities – are not debt instruments and their
principle and returns are not guaranteed or insured against risks. These differences – the risk sharing and
the ownership of underlying assets – have strong implications for SPVs in Islamic finance.
The study is divided into five sections. Section I introduces the SPV as an important part of
securitization in Islamic and conventional finance. Section II explains the risk sharing principle and its
role as a key departure of Islamic finance from conventional finance. Section III brings the theoretical
background of SPVs and the incentives of using SPVs for financing. Section IV comes out with the
difference between securitization in a risk sharing financing mode and a risk transferring one. Section V
compares Islamic securitization SPVs with a conventional SPV. Section VI concludes the study.
2. Risk Sharing in Islamic Finance
The devastation that 2007-2008 financial turmoil has inflicted on the global economy has provided the
proponents of Islamic finance with a fresh impetus to highlight the fallibility of the conventional system
and push the divine one, as they understand it, to the fore as a replacement. The proponents found ‘no
risk, no gain’ dictum and discussion on it not buried too deep in the literature for its restoration on the
pedestal. The revival is led by Prof Abbas Mirakhor. Risk-sharing has been a major theme in his recent
lectures and writings on Islamic finance including the books he has co-authored with others. (Hasan,
2015)
The ultimate implication of risk sharing is that unlike the conventional finance in which the use of
debt-like instruments along with leverage results in the transfer of risk from borrowers to creditors,
Islamic finance would recommend the use of assets and sharing their risks among the owners. Everyone
who has an ownership claim on the asset must bear a part of its risk proportionate to its ownership.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the fundamental stability of the conventional
financial system has been seriously questioned. Excessive leveraging, combined with an inherent asset-
liability mismatch, exposes institutions to unsupportable risk, and threatens the overall soundness of the
financial system. Islamic finance eliminates debt financing and instead promotes equity or direct asset
financing, which allows for risk-sharing instead of risk-shifting. (Askari, 2012)
Debt financing, fit in the core of the conventional finance is known as the source of financial
instability. Mirakhor (2009, p.58) explains the role of debt financing:
The pivotal element of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis is debt. So important is this element
that Minsky considered his hypothesis as a “theory of the impact of debt on system behavior”. There are
two forces that push debt financing to higher and higher levels in the upward phase of the cycle. First,
market participants borrow more and more because asset price increases validate their expectations,
which undergirded their increased borrowing in the first place. Moreover, as prices increase, the value of
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their collateral increases and with it their creditworthiness, allowing them to borrow more. Second,
banks and other highly leveraged financial institutions expand credit and push lending in two ways: (i) as
prices of assets increase, their balance sheets expand, allowing them to extend more credit; and (ii) they
find new ways and means of credit expansion through financial innovation. These financial
intermediaries are, after all, what Minsky called “merchants of debt”. They are constantly searching for
ways and means of expanding their balance sheets. Thus, the debt structure continues to be extended
throughout the financial system and beyond to the whole economy.
The essence of risk sharing in Islamic finance would prevent the institutions from creating too much
debt and endanger the stability of the whole system. Chapra (2009) argues that in a system where profit
and loss sharing (PLS) does not exist, and the repayment of loans with interest is generally guaranteed,
there would be no checking over the excess lending and debt-creation.
In 1980s, when the traditional banking sector went unprofitable due to the intense competition in
United States, the securitization came out as the new business line of debt-creation. Borrowing by money
market instruments and lending through securitization, which is called wholesale funding, would let the
financial institutions to escape regulatory capital requirements and leverage ratios that were designed for
traditional deposit-loan model of financing. Using off-balance sheet financing via establishing SPVs,
financial institutions have been able to hide their risky assets and display a more solvent position for
themselves. Although the use of SPVs in off-balance sheet activities had made partial financial distress
later - like Enron, which created over 3,000 SPVs for borrowing and went bankrupt in 2001 (Gorton,
2007) – in 2008 the whole system collapsed. There are lots of research in the literature that condemn the
securitization and using SPVs in off-balance sheet financing for the excessive risk taking behaviors and
the emergence of the crisis (Fligstein 2012, Fligstein 2011, Riddiough 2010, Farag 2015, Nadauld 2009,
Acharya 2009, Szablowska 2010) however looking deep at the crisis illustrates that without a risk-transfer
approach to finance, the role of SPVs and securitization in 2008 crisis is ambiguous. The role of the risk
transfer has rarely been discussed explicitly in the literature. (Buchanan 2016)
The problem of an unstable debt based method of financing has made the Islamic finance asset-linked
approach a compelling alternative for conventional finance. In theory, Islamic finance is resilient to
shocks because of its emphasis on risk sharing, limits on excessive risk taking, and strong link to real
activities. (Hussain 2015). The mobilisation of financial resources toward productive activities through
risk sharing enables the Islamic financial system to actualize economic justice and social participation in
an efficient manner. The asset-backed equity-financing nature of Islamic finance is conducive to financial
system stability because returns which can only be known ex post, and thus shared on the same basis, are
not divorced from risk. (Maghrebi, 2015). Neverthless, Islamic Sukuk is capable of funding social
services (Mohamad, et al. 2017).
3. Incentives of using SPVs
According to the Modigliani-Miller theorem, in a perfect capital market the value of a corporation is
unaffected by how the corporate liabilities is divided up in different ways. So if capital markets were
perfect, there would be no incentive for establishing SPVs and using them in structured finance. As
Modigliani (1958) argues: "Under either formulation, the cost of capital is equal to the rate of interest on
bonds, regardless of whether the funds are acquired through debt instruments or through new issues of
common stock. Indeed, in a world of sure returns, the distinction between debt and equity funds reduces
largely to one of terminology".
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However it is obvious that in real world financial institutions have strong incentives toward
securitization and off-balance sheet financing via SPVs. This means that capital market imperfections
usually make institutions to use SPVs in some ways. It is worth noting that these imperfections are
common in both Islamic and conventional financial markets, so the incentives here are valid for both
Islamic and conventional SPVs.
The title of SPV is closely tied with the securitization which is a well-known revolutionary method of
financing in recent decades. In securitization, a firm chooses a bunch of high-quality assets on its balance
sheets; sell them off to an SPV and repackaging them in the form of new financial instruments which
rated usually higher than the whole firm’s credit rating. For a firm to securitize its assets and use them to
finance its activities, the use of a SPV is vital. Using a SPV, firms benefit the “bankruptcy remoteness” of
these vehicles and bear lower cost of capital.
Although lower financing costs is a compelling enough for a firm to establish a SPV, there are also
other reasons that justify securitization and costs of handling a SPV. Reducing the moral hazard problem
is one of that reasons. Wang (2016) explains how in financial intermediaries such as bank, the insiders
who have discretion over the use of assets on-balance sheet have incentives to divert assets. In his words:
This moral hazard can be generally interpreted as insiders' incentives to engage in ex-post activities
that benefit themselves but can hurt outside investors. For example, insiders of a bank have the incentive
to ex-post misuse the cash flows of the assets held on-balance sheet, or to ex-post take on higher risks.
Insiders benefit from such activities, but outside investors are the ones bearing losses in bad states. The
paper shows that securitization can reduce this moral hazard by increasing the remoteness of assets from
managers in financial institutions.
Another perspective from which using SPVs benefits the firms is the agency cost problem. Agency
costs are the costs generated from the conflicts between interests of managers and shareholders caused by
separation of ownership and management in modern corporations.  Using data on 357 CMBS deals
involving over 46,000 loans, Gan and Mayer (2007) found that in a process of securitization, the special
servicer (the third party who is in charge with handling delinquencies and defaults) appear to behave
more efficiently, making fewer costly transfers of delinquent loans to special servicing, but liquidating a
higher percentage of loans that are referred to special servicing.
One of the channel from which the principle-agency problem leads to the higher agency costs, is
through the cash flows. Managers often prefer to keep higher cash than the efficient level in a firm. It is
due to the lower risk of cash compare to other assets and thereby lower responsibility for managers. Ngo
(2002) argues that management may refrain from encumbering all assets to provide a safety mechanism
for itself by inefficiently reducing the riskiness of the corporation and obscuring the effects of shirking.
This problem will be intensified when the firms are under control of highly risk averse managers.
Additionally, keeping cash benefits management through several the positive side effects that do not need
to be registered in financial statements and is hardly tractable via auditing. To encounter this sort of
agency costs, transferring cash flows to a third party through establishing a SPV will restrain the
management control on the cash flows.
One the most important problems that convinces the financial institutions to use SPVs for financing, is
the asymmetric information that is in the heart of financial markets. The asymmetric information problem
refers to the condition in which one party in the market or firm possesses “hidden information” which is
unknown the other party. This will make difficulties in asset pricing and corporate governance. Iacobucci
(2001) has extensively examined the role of SPVs and securitization in reducing information
asymmetries. He divides the information asymmetries in two sets: hidden actions and hidden information.
Hidden actions refers to the set of informational asymmetries between managers and investors about
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managerial actions and uncertain factors that affect security payoffs and that are realized during the
period between security issue and the date of security maturity. Hidden information is the set of
informational differences among investors that exists at the time that securities are issued. Iacobucci
shows that transferring assets to a SPV and securitizing them will enhance the main mechanisms through
which the hidden actions of managers are minimized. These mechanisms are direct monitoring,
managerial reputation, takeovers and explicit incentive pay. Transferring assets to a SPV can enhance
each mechanism by reducing the “noise” in firm performance as a signal of managerial performance that
results from corporate assets with cash flows that are uncertain and insensitive to managerial discretion or
effort. Securitized assets are often cash flows such as receivables with risk that is more easily assessed
than the risk of the general assets of the firm, such as physical assets or intangibles such as goodwill or
growth opportunities within a market. Informational asymmetries may therefore arise with respect to the
returns on the general assets of the firm, while investors are equally informed about the prospective
returns on assets such as receivables. Iacobucci says this means that issuing claims on the receivables
avoids the lemons market premium that would be attached to an issue of claims on general assets and can
solve the informational asymmetries among investors.
4. Securitization in a Risk Sharing financial system
Securitization in conventional finance involves the issuance of debts backed by the assets which are
rated more than the average credit rate of the whole company. In other words, securitization can be
regarded as a way to issue debt and raise funds that have a higher rating than that of the company.
(Kosowski, 2004). In its most basic form, the process involves two steps. In step one, a bank with loans or
other producing asset - that is called the originator - identifies the assets it wants to remove from its
balance sheet, pools them and then sells this asset pool to a SPV.
It is how the SPV securitize its asset pool that determines the difference between Islamic and
conventional securitization. According to what has been said in section 1, the Islamic securitization
facilitates risk sharing between equity holders and the originator, while the conventional securitization
facilitates risk transfer from originator to equity holders. This key difference is the point of departure
from conventional to Islamic finance.
In second step of the conventional securitization, the company issues tradable, interest-bearing
securities that are sold to capital market investors. The new securities are nothing but the new liabilities
that is backed by the underlying assets and the holders of these “asset backed securities” do not have the
ownership right over the underlying assets. Asset backed securities are often debt-like instruments and the
cash flows from securitized assets provides the mean for servicing the debt (Fed, 1990). In most cases, the
originator collects payments from the original borrowers and passes them on directly to the SPV and
because of that it is called “pass-through securitization”. In conventional securitization, the security
holders do not bear the risk of volatility in underlying assets cash flow; they just receive the pre-
determined interest rate. The only risk that is held by security holders is the credit risk of the originator
that is transferred to them via SPV. In other words, conventional securitization represents a source of
finance based on the transfer of credit from issuers to investors. The nature of risk transfer at the core of
conventional securitization led to the situation that an increasing number of financial institutions have
adopted an “originate-and-distribute” business strategy of loan origination by using securitization to
transfer credit risk from their balance sheets to other banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and other
financial institutions. (Jobst, 2010)
On the other hand, the Islamic mode of securitization avoids transferring risk and tries to distribute the
risks between both parties. The Islamic securitization, sells the underlying assets pooled in SPV to
investors as well all of its risks. Security holders in Islamic securitization have the pro rata ownership
over the underlying assets and receive every cash flow that is generated from them. The securitized assets
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are completely linked to the underlying assets and every change is reflected in their rate of return. These
“Asset linked securities” are not debt-like instruments. The originator collects the underlying assets cash
flow and pays them through the SPV to security holders. Because of that, Islamic mode of securitization
is necessarily a “pay-through securitization”. Because there is no incentive for transferring risk in Islamic
securitization, the Islamic financial institutions would implement the “originate-to-hold” strategy which
means they will hold the securitized assets in order to gain real returns.
The conventional securitization has recently been the subject of serious criticisms. As argued by Shin
(2009), originate to distribute securitization facilitates greater credit supply and encourages the financial
intermediaries to maintain their highest level of leverage to maximize their return on equity. The high
level of leverage in a risk transfer mode of securitization endangers the stability of the system on the
event of default. The departure of banks from traditional originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute model
in US has led to the growth of the syndicated loan market from $339 billion in 1988 to $2.2 trillion in
2007. This has led to the entrance of nonbank investors such as insurance companies, investment
management firms, finance companies, collateralized loan obligation managers, private equity firms,
brokers and investment banks, pension funds and foreign nonbank organizations to the credit market
(Bord, 2012) and the fall of the whole financial market in 2007-8 crisis.
The collapse of the conventional mode of securitization has brought the Islamic securitization as a
serious alternative to the sights. Jobst (2010) says as policy-makers and regulators hasten to re-design the
financial sector architecture, the soul-searching in conventional finance has directed attention to
alternatives modes of securitization to fill the void of unmet credit demand. This effort also involves an
assessment of Islamic investment certificates or sukuk, which have grown into a notable capital market
segment. The Shariah principles for financial contracts attribute the ownership of the underlying assets to
the sukuk holders and oblige them to bear the risks of their owned assets. Radzi & Muhamed (2019)
points that these distinguishing features led to Sukuk to be a different category of financial instrument as
of conventional bonds and equities. This will change the paradigm and brings a new mode of
securitization which shares the risks, instead of transferring them. In addition, there is no leverage in
Islamic securitization and financial intermediaries cannot expand credit by issuing new equities. The
securitized financial assets in Islamic finance are linked to the underlying real assets and their return
fluctuates as the cash flows from underlying assets fluctuate. The risk sharing in securitization would
prevent the financial institutions to transfer their credit risk to another party and leads to the
transformation of their business strategy from “originate-to-distribute” to “originate-to-hold”. The
originate-to-hold strategy has nothing with the speculation behaviors and enhances the sustainability of
financial markets.
Changing in securitization mode necessarily needs a change in the role and characteristics of SPVs. A
SPV which is established to transfer risk, is much different from the one which is not obliged guarantee
the underlying assets in the event of the originator’s default. Instead, a risk sharing SPV has more to
preserve the ownership of equity holders on underlying assets and reduce the asymmetric information
problem as its common in profit-loss sharing contracts.
5. Difference Between SPV in Islamic finance and conventional finance
Bank for International Settlement (2009) defines the SPV a vehicle whose operations are typically
limited to the acquisition and financing of specific assets or liabilities. The general definition of the SPV
is identical in both Islamic and conventional finance; however the way that SPV implement its duty
differs.
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The most important features of an Islamic SPV is facilitating the risk sharing. The risk sharing
principle implies the rejection of debt financing and the ownership of the underlying assets by security
holders. In the direction of that some governing and regulatory bodies in Islamic finance has addressed
standards for Shari’ah compliant financing which has implications for Islamic SPVs. One of these kind of
standards is addressed by The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
(AAOIFI).
AAOIFI (2007) has introduced six conditions that should be fulfilled in Sukuk issuance:
 Sukuk must be owned by sukuk holders with all rights and obligations of ownership
 Sukuk must not represents receivables or debt
 The manager of the Sukuk cannot offer loans to Sukuk holder when the actual earnings fall short
of expected earnings.
 It is not permissible for the mudharib (investment manager), sharik (partner), or wakil (agent) to
re-purchase the assets from sukuk holders for its nominal value, when the sukuk are extinguished,
at the end of its maturity. It is, however, permissible to undertake the purchase on the basis of the
net value of assets, its market value, fair value or a price to be agreed, at the time of their actual
purchase,
 It is permissible for a lessee in a sukuk al-ijarah to undertake to purchase the leased assets when
the sukuk are extinguished for its nominal value, provided he {lessee} is not also a partner,
mudharib or investment agent.
 Shari'ah Supervisory Boards should not limit their role to the issuance of fatwa on the
permissibility of the structure of sukuk.
According to AAOIFI resolution on Sukuk an Islamic SPV should honor four distinctive features that
make him distinguished from conventional SPV.
5.1 Acquisition of real assets
In conventional securitization, a SPV is set up solely for the purpose of the securitization and might be
a trust, limited-liability Company, partnership or a corporation. In Islamic securitization, the objectives
set out in the constitutional documents of the SPV also must not infringe on the prohibition of riba and
haram under Islamic law (Jobst, 2007). Several Islamic schools of jurisprudence prohibit the receivables
and financial assets securitization. This requires Islamic SPVs to acquire only real assets.
5.2 Transfer of legal title (ownership)
One of the important issues in securitization is that the transfer of underlying assets from originator’s
balance sheet to SPV should be honor the principle of “true sale”, a sale that is sufficient under
bankruptcy law to remove the assets from the originator’s bankruptcy estate (Schwarcz, 2011).
Both Islamic and conventional finance accept the necessity of true sale, however their definition is
different. Common law (practiced in the UK) recognizes sales that fall short of true sales as valid sales. A
sale that falls short of a true sale allows a “seller” to “sell” an asset and to retain legal ownership of the
asset thus “sold” at the same time. Such a sale does not require the transfer of legal ownership from the
seller to the buyer; a sale that falls short of a true sale transfers merely “beneficial ownership” on the
buyer (Abdullah, 2012). In other words, conventional finance – which is working under the common law
– considers the transfer of “interests” as true sale and do not insist on the transfer of legal title of assets.
Schwarcz (2001) explains that in many (conventional) securitization transactions, the SPV purchases
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undivided interests in receivables and the Bankruptcy Reform Act applies to the sale of interests in
receivables.
Sukuk holders are ultimately the owners of the underlying assets which are securitized in form of
Sukuk. Islamic spv should preserve their ownership and protect it from what happens for the originator
firm. Although removing the underlying assets from the originator balance sheet and transferring them to
the SPV will protect the assets from the credit risk of the originator, it does not completely mean that the
ownership of the assets is preserved. Any appreciation of the assets’ price, belongs to the equity holders
and the SPV must ensure it is not violated by revaluation of the originator’s asset. Without the transfer of
the legal title to SPV, the risk sharing principle is violated and the Islamic instruments would be similar to
debt instrument. In order to ensure the ownership of Sukuk holders on underlying assets, Islamic finance
insists on complete transfer of ownership to SPV. In the popular sale-leaseback ijarah sukuk transaction
structure (“sale model”), the SPV holds legal title to the assets, which are leased back to the originator
(Jobst, 2007). AAOIFI (2007) addresses that the manager issuing the Sukuk must certify the transfer of
ownership of assets in its books, and must not keep them as his own assets. Based on the insistence of
Islamic finance on legal title transfer, Hidayat (2013) concludes that there is no true sale in asset based
structure of Sukuk since Sukuk holders do not have concern in the underlying asset. Therefore an Islamic
SPV must attain the complete ownership of the assets which is not necessary for a conventional SPV.
5.3 Pro rata ownershi:
Because the SPV’s business activities are constrained and its ability to incur debt is limited, it faces the
risk of a shortfall of cash below what it is obligated to pay investors. This chance is minimized via credit
enhancement (Gorton, 2007). A common way to do this is for the SPV to issue multiple classes, or
tranches of securities, with the most senior-priority securities being paid first (a senior-subordinated
structure). Senior securities are thereby made less risky than the average risk on the SPV‘s financial assets
because collections on all those assets, even collections intended to otherwise support payment of
subordinate-priority securities, are dedicated first to assure payment of the senior securities (Schwarcz,
2011). Conventional SPVs mostly use tranches to make safer, highly liquid, attractive assets.
Nevertheless, it could not be used by Islamic SPVs.
Using tranches for an Islamic SPV is inconsistent with the risk sharing principle. Dividing the SPV to
classes with different risk-return profile means that some classes bear the risks of others while both are
the owners of the same assets. In addition, tranches liken the Sukuk to debt-like instruments. Maghrebi
(2016) argues when cashflows from the pooled assets are dedicated to servicing particular tranches
according to predetermined rates of return independent of underlying risks, there are concerns about a
regression to the notion of interest. To avoid these problems, Islamic SPVs should represent the pro rata
ownership of Sukuk holders on underlying assets that means, everyone is exposed to the same level of
risk as others and receives the return without priority.
5.4 Ex post valuatio:
The value of a conventional SPV is certainly determined before the creation of any cashflow. It
services instruments that bear interest; regardless of how much cashflow is made in real sector, the
financial sector valuates the SPV according to the risk-adjusted interest rate assigned to the underlying
asset pool.
Because the Islamic instruments prices are theoretically a function of asset returns in real sector, the
valuation of an Islamic SPV cannot be determined at the first of the period. According to the level of risk
that is shared by the Sukuk holder, the returns may fluctuate and differ from one period to other. It is
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possible for a SPV to estimate the returns ex ante, but the certain valuation is possible only after the
realization of cash flows. So islamic spvs’ valuation is Ex-post.
6. Conclusion
This paper is concerned with the similarities and differences between special purpose vehicles (SPV)
in Islamic and conventional finance. Risk sharing principle as the Islamic finance building block is the
basis for substantial differences with conventional finance. Risk sharing requires a financial sector which
is affiliated with real sector and its risk. On the other hand, the conventional finance, using interest
bearing debt-like instruments typically tends to risk transfer. As a result, Islamic finance has been known
with more stability than conventional finance in recent 2008-9 crisis.
Although the two systems is basically different, there are general incentives toward SPVs that’s
common in both Islamic and conventional finance. These incentives are inherently come as a result of
capital mark incompleteness. Agency costs and asymmetric information are two main sources of
incompleteness that justifies the use of SPVs in financing.
Risk sharing and risk transfer have serious implications in securitization. In conventional finance, the
securitization is a process of transferring credit risk from originators to security holders. This will make
securitization a process of credit expansion through issuing debt-like instruments and leads to an
“originate-to-distribute” strategy. On the other hand, Islamic finance mode of securitization facilitates
sharing risks among security holders, so it issues asset-linked securities and results in an “originate-to-
hold” strategy.
The result of different modes of securitization is reflected in SPVs. Islamic SPVs diverge from
conventional ones in 4 ways; all are intrinsically resulted from risk sharing principle. First, Islamic SPVs
acquire real assets while the acquisition of debt or receivables is prohibited by Islamic jurisprudential
schools. Second, Islamic SPVs hold the legal title of assets. Transferring beneficial ownership, as is
common in conventional finance, is in contrast with risk sharing principle. Third, Islamic SPVs represents
the pro rata ownership of Sukuk holders. Dividing a SPV to different tranches with different risk-return
profile, means some enjoys less risk but having the same ownership right as other. Fourth, Islamic SPVs
are valuated ex post. The certain valuation of Islamic SPVs is possible only after the realization of
cashflows, unlike conventional SPVs which are valuated according to the risk-adjusted interest rate
assigned to their underlying assets.
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